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Price expectations  play  a critical  role  in commodity markets  where  producers  must make  input
decisions well  before output is realized. This  paper brings together  alternative  expectations
regimes,  their estimation,  and hypothesis  tests for use in structural commodity  models to
determine  their use by  commodity  producers.  Extrapolative  mechanisms  and rational
expectations  are considered under risk neutrality  and risk aversion.  The assumptions  implicit
in the  use of aggregate  data in these models are  made explicit.  Structural  models using
individual  survey data  are discussed.  While Muth's  rational  expectations  hypothesis has found
widespread  acceptance in the  macroeconomic  literature,  empirical results from industry  studies
indicate  that commodity producers  may have  heterogeneous  price  expectations,  with no  single
expectations  hypothesis  dominating.  This is not surprising  given that different  producers
possess  different  information and have different  costs associated  with  information  collection
and processing.
Commodity  production  typically  involves  a time  diction error, which at least some astute producers
lag  between  input  application  and  output realiza-  should be able to profitably exploit. Second, price
tion.  As a result,  producers  must base production  prediction  errors  should  be uncorrelated  with  the
decisions  on  known input prices  and  their  output  information  set  available  at  the time  of  the  fore-
price  forecasts.  Economists  have  hypothesized  cast.  If the prediction  error is correlated with any
alternative  price  expectation regimes,  mainly  na-  variable  in the information  set, the forecaster  has
ive  expectations,  adaptive  expectations,  quasi-  not made efficient use of all available information.
rational,  and rational expectations.  However,  since  While  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  has
Muth's seminal paper (1961),  economists have de-  obvious appeal from an economist's perspective,  it
voted increasing attention to developing economet-  is not without  fault. The rational  expectations  hy-
ric  models  compatible  with  his  rational  expecta-  pothesis  implicitly assumes  information  is  scarce
tions hypothesis.  Muth's  hypothesis  is  appealing  yet  costless  to  obtain  and  process  (Feige  and
because it treats information like any other input in  Pearce  1976;  Arrow  1978;  Grossman  and  Stiglitz
a firm's production process:  producers  are hypoth-  1976).  When  information  collection  and  process-
esized  to  use  available  information  efficiently  in  ing is costly, producers'  optimal forecasts may in-
forming their predictions of future prices.  This hy-  volve simplistic rules,  resulting in possibly biased
pothesis  has important implications. First, produc-  and inefficient forecasts of future prices.  With pos-
ers'  predictions  of  future  prices  should  be unbi-  itive  information  costs,  any  number  of  expecta-
ased;  otherwise,  there  would be  a systematic  pre-  tions regimes may reflect the true underlying price
forecasting  model  used  by  producers.  Indeed,
when  the  cost  of forecasting  is positive,  rational
Senior  authorship is not  assigned.  utility maximizing agents will choose to use a sim-
Diana M.  Burton is  assistant professor, Department of Forest Science,  per expectations  mechanism,  like  naive  expecta-
and  H.  Alan  Love  is associate  professor,  Department of  Agricultural  the inaccuracies
Economics,  Texas  A&M University.  This  manuscript reports  research  tions, if the losses  incurred  due to the inaccuracies
conducted  by  the  Texas  Agricultural  Experiment  Station,  the  Texas  of the expectations  are less than the  expected  net
A&M University  System. The authors thank the Nordic Risk Project for  benefit from  a more accurate  but  tly,  peta-
partial  funding  of this  research.  They  also  thank  participants  of  the  benefit from  a more accurate,  but costly,  expecta-
Nordic Risk Project  and anonymous reviewers  for helpful  comments.  tions mechanism  (Evans  and Ramey  1992).214  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
This  paper reviews  alternative  expectations  re-  where  error  term  v t - (0,ao2),  0 o and  oa  are  pa-
gimes,  their estimation,  and  the  hypothesis  tests  rameters,  and ot2 is a vector of parameters for input
that have  been  applied  to  determine  their accep-  prices  w _1. Since output  price Pt is unknown  at
tance  among  producers.  We  distinguish  between  time t - 1, farmers  must form price expectations.
the usual  case  where  producers'  expectations  are  Expected  price  -_  ut  is formed at time t  - 1 for
not directly  observable and the  case where expec-  time t, given  available  information at time t  - 1:
tations  have  been  revealed  through  survey  panel 
data.  Empirical  results from industry  studies  with  (2)  t--P  =  Et-l(Ptl[  t-  ),
implicit  price  expectations  indicate  commodity  where Et_ (.)  is the expectations  operator condi-
producers  may  have heterogeneous  price expecta-  tional  on  the  information  set  flt_  available  at
tions.  This  is  not  surprising  given  that  different  time t  - 1.
producers  possess  different  information  and  have  At time t,  processors  of agricultural  output base
different  costs  associated with information  collec-  their demand yt  on known product price Pt, a vec-
tion and  processing.  To  investigate  the possibility  tor  of  known  output  prices  zt and  a  vector  of
of heterogeneous  expectations,  we  turn  to studies  known prices  for other inputs  into the production
that  use  panel  survey  data  of  individual's  price  process  u,:
expectations.  Results  from  these  studies  are  also  ()  +  V,
inconclusive.  For the most part, panel survey stud- 
ies have focused exclusively  on testing the rational  where  error  term  vD  - (0,  orD),  o3  and  p1  are
expectations hypothesis. The limited focus of these  parameters,  and  p2 and  13  are  parameter vectors
studies  results,  in part,  from the  kinds of hypoth-  corresponding  to output  price vector  z,  and  other
esis tests that are available  using only survey data.  processing  costs vector  ut, respectively.  The sup-
In the future,  an alternative hypothesis test strategy  ply  and  demand  equations  can be  estimated  as  a
that combines observed firm level data with survey  system  only if price  expectations  are  directly  ob-
data could be used to distinguish producers'  adher-  served.  For  now,  we  assume  that  producers'  ex-
ence to alternative  price expectations mechanisms.  pected output prices  are not observed.
A  Simple  Aggregate  Model  with Unobserved  Extrapolative  Expectations  Models
Price Expectations
Extrapolative  price expectations  models formulate
In this section,  we  specify a simple model of farm  expected  price  as  a  function  of only  past  prices.
supply  and  processor  demand  for  an  agricultural  There are  a number of variations.
commodity.  While we  model an agricultural  com-
modity,  the  methods  could  be applied  to  any  re-  Naive Expectations
source or product that involves  a time lag between
input  decisions  and  output  realization.  We  pre-  The  earliest expectations  models  simply  assumed
sume  farmers'  supply  decisions  are  made  under  that  the  best  forecast  of  future  price  is  current
uncertainty  while  processors  decisions  are not.  In  price:  naive  expectations
principle,  any model  should  capture farmers'  atti-  (4)  t-  t  = Pt- 
tudes  toward  risk  regardless  of  the  expectations
mechanism.  Early models,  including Muth's ratio-  Naive  expectations  implicitly  assume  that the un-
nal  expectations  model  (1961),  used  a certainty-  derlying prce seres  follows  a random walk:
equivalent  framework  and  implicitly assumed risk  (5)  p" = Pt-  +  e,
neutrality.  For now,  we  will also  utilize  the  cer-
tainty equivalent  assumption.  where et is  an  error term.  This simple  model pre-
Consider  a  market  characterized  by  aggregate  sumes that  price at production planning time  con-
supply  and demand equations.  Stocks are assumed  tains all the information from which astute produc-
to be inconsequential,  or unchanging  from period  ers  could  profit.  It  ignores  possible  producer
to period,  and hence  to have no effect  on equilib-  knowledge of anticipated supply  or demand shifts
rium price.  Competitive  farmers  are  assumed  to  and their effects on price.  In addition,  in the pres-
allocate inputs with price vector, w,_ i at time t - ence of upward or downward price trends,  the na-
1 to produce  output yt  at time t.  Aggregate  supply  ive expectations  mechanism will continuously  un-
is given by  der- or overpredict  future price.
Econometric Estimation. Assuming  the  naive
(1)  yt  =  to  +  ol t -lPt  +  o2 wt-  +  vt,  price  expectation  holds,  unknown  model parame-Burton and Love  Alternative Expectations Regimes  215
ters can be  estimated by  substituting  equation  (4)  (7)  ys  =
into supply  equation (1) and estimating  the result-  s  +  - X)+  _t(1  - )p
ing supply  equation  using OLS.  However,  if sup-  +  - +,_  +  s,
ply  and  demand  errors  are  correlated,  OLS  will2  t
result in biased and inconsistent  estimates.  In that  where  vt =  vs  - Xv_ 1. If equation  (7)  is  esti-
case,  consistent  and  asymptotically  efficient  pa-  mated  OLS,  resulting  parameter estimates  will be
rameter estimates can be obtained  applying three-  biased  and  inconsistent  since  yS_  is  correlated
stage  least  squares  or full-information  maximum  with the autocorrelated disturbance  '. However,  it
likelihood  estimation  to  the  supply  and  demand  is  possible  to  obtain  consistent,  though  not  effi-
equations.  Serially correlated errors in equation (5)  cient,  estimates  using  the  instrumental  variable
can also result in biased and inconsistent  OLS pa-  method  with  wt_2 serving  as  an  instrument  for
rameter estimates.  Consistent estimates can be ob-  yS_  . (For estimation  details,  see Johnston  1984,
tained  using  an  instrumental  variable  estimator  ch.  9.)
(see Johnston  1984,  ch.  9).  A maximum  likelihood  (ML) estimator  is  also
Literature. While  widely  criticized,  naive  ex-  available,  which  gives consistent  and efficient pa-
pectations are often presumed when researchers re-  rameter estimates.  To  develop  the ML  estimator,
quire  a  simple  price  expectations  mechanism  to  rewrite  equation  (6)  as  the  infinite  geometrically
complete  a model specification.  Focused  on other  decreasing series
economic  questions,  many  researchers  ignore  the-  ))
potential effects of the chosen  expectations  mech-  (8)  t  (1  -)p  —  +  1  - X)Xpt
anism on research  results.  (1  - +
This  series  can be rewritten  as
Adaptive Expectations  (9)
t-i
The adaptive expectations model is well known but  t-iP  =  (1  -)ipti  +  (1 - )ipt-i.
regarded  as  a rather  ad hoc  expectations  process  i=o  i=t
(Nerlove  1972). Expected  price in the next period  The first right-hand  term  is historic  prices  and  is
is formed by adjusting expected price by a propor-  observabe. The second right-hand term represents
tion  of  the  error  made  in  predicting  the  current  expected price at t =  . It involves data predating
period's  price  (Hicks  1939;  Koyck  1954;  Cagan  time period  t  =  0 and,  hence,  is not observable.
1956; Muth  1960; Nerlove  1958):  The  second  right-hand  term  can  be  rewritten  as
e-  --  e~X_`'E(po  - uL)  =  Xt '  where  p is  the mean  of the
(6)  t-iPt  - s  t-i-2Pt-\ - price series pt and 8  = E(po - R).  8 can be treated
as an  additional parameter to be estimated.
~(I  - X)(Pt_  - t-2Pt-  )The  first right-hand term of equation (9)  can be
where (1 - X)  is the forecast adjustment factor.  If  rewritten  as an  observable  variable  g,:
X =  1,  a price expectation never changes,  regard-
less of past prediction  error or any other informa-  t-
tion.  If X =  0,  the adaptive  expectation  model  is  (  gt =  (1 - x)pt-i.
equivalent  to the naive expectation  model.  If 0  <  i=o
X <  1, price expectations  are adjusted each period
by some proportion of the discrepancy between the  Given a value of X, a data series for expected price
latest price  and  the price  expectation  formed  for  can be built up recursively  as:
that period.  If price is trending upward,  the  adap-  g  = (1- -)p
tive  expectations  model  will  continuously  under- 
predict  future  prices.  If price  is  trending  down-  (11)  g2 =  (1  - X)(p 2 +  p)
ward, future prices will be overpredicted. Like the  g3  =  (  - )(p3  +  2  +  2p).
naive  expectations  mechanism,  adaptive  expecta-
tions  do not  account for  the  fountain of other in-  This allows supply, equation (1),  to be rewritten as
formation available  to economic agents.  (12)  y  =  o  + a(g, +  '8)
Econometric Estimation. Supply,  equation  (7),  '+  l tw  +  vs
is obtained by  applying  the Koyck transformation  2W 
to  expected  price,  equation  (6),  and  substituting  Assuming v t - N(0,uc2),  maximum likelihood es-
the result into equation  (1),  giving  timation proceeds  with a grid search on X over the216  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
interval 0  - X - 1. For each  specified value of X,  variables.  Estimation  of  rational  distributed  lag
OLS  is performed  on equation  (12)  to obtain  the  models  is  discussed  in  Jorgenson  (1966)  and  in
supply  parameters.  Standard  errors  can  be  com-  Maddala  and  Rao (1971).
puted for X and all other estimated parameters from  Under  the  quasi-rational  expectations  hypothe-
the information  matrix  (Johnston  1984,  359).  Al-  sis,  agents form future  value forecasts from an op-
ternative estimation  procedures are available if the  timal statistical predictor such as an autoregressive
supply error term vs is serially  correlated or if the  integrated  moving-average  predictor  or  a  simple
supply model contains lagged dependent  variables  vector autoregression.  Agents  are  not  required  to
(Johnston  1984,  ch.  9;  Doran  1988).  know structural parameters for the entire economic
Literature. Adaptive  expectations  models  have  model,  as  they  would  be  under  the full  rational
been widely used and  were formalized by Nerlove  expectations  hypothesis  (Nelson  and  Bessler
(1958).  Askari  and  Cummings  (1977) provide  an  1992).  Friedman  (1978),  Wallis  (1980),  and
extensive survey of applications of adaptive expec-  Bessler  (1980,  1982),  show that  the  adaptive  ex-
tations  models  in  the  literature.  More  recently,  pectations model can  be represented  as an ARIMA
Shonkwiler  and  Hinckley  (1985)  have  utilized  (0,1,1)  model,  and  as such,  the adaptive  expecta-
adaptive  expectations  to model  feeder cattle  mar-  tions  model  is  a member of the  quasi-rational  ex-
kets; Phillip  and  Abalu  (1987)  consider  price  ex-  pectations  family.
pectations of Nigerian farmers; Doran (1988)  pro-  Futures  prices  have  also  been  used  as  direct
vides an interesting specification test to distinguish  measures  of aggregate price expectations  (Gardner
between lag  structures resulting  from adaptive  ex-  1976;  Shonkwiler  and  Hinckley  1985;  Chavas,
pectations  and  closely  related  partial  adjustment  Pope,  and Kao 1983).  Econometric estimation pro-
supply processes.  ceeds by substituting harvest time futures price ob-
served  at  planting  time for expected  price  and  by
Other Extrapolative  Expectations Models  estimating supply  and  demand directly.
The  naive  and  adaptive  expectations  models  are  Rational Expectations  Models
members of a class  known as extrapolative  expec-
tations models,  which can be written in the general  Since  Muth's  seminal paper,  economists  have de-
form  voted increasing attention to developing  economet-
ric  models  compatible  with  the  rational  expecta-
tions hypothesis. The rational expectations  hypoth-
(13)  t-lpt  =  OiPt-J'  esis  asserts  that  "the economy  generally does  not
=0o  waste  information,  and  that  expectations  depend
specifically  on the structure  of the entire system'
where  0j  are fixed weights  (Nerlove  1983).  Other  (Muth  1961,  315).  Specifically,  the rational expec-
extrapolative  expectations  models  include  Almon  tations hypothesis  maintains that firms'  subjective
distributed lag models (Almon 1965),  rational dis-  expectations  should be distributed about the objec-
tributed lag models  (Jorgenson,  1966),  and quasi-  tive  predicted  outcomes  from  economic  theory.
rational  expectations  models  (Nerlove  1967;  This  implies that rational expectations  are "model
Nerlove,  Grether, and Carvalho  1979; Nelson  and  consistent"  forward-looking  projections  of  vari-
Bessler  1992).  ables.  In practice,  empirical  rational  expectations
Almon  distributed  lag  models,  also  known  as  models  equate  individual  subjective  expectations
polynomial  distributed  lag  models,  approximate  to  the  objective  expectation  generated  from  the
the  true distribution  of lag  coefficients  with low-  model and,  as a result,  are not invariant to model
order  polynomial  functions  of  lagged  variables,  specification.
This  reduces  the  number  of  lag  parameters  that  Specification  of  a  rational-expectations-based
must be estimated,  reducing the  problem  of mul-  econometric  model  requires  deriving  a  price  ex-
ticollinearity  associated  with  estimating  long  lag  pectation function  that can  be  substituted into the
functions  (Almon  1965).  Good  review  essays  on  supply  equation.  Given  information  available
distributed lag models  are Almon (1965),  Griliches  when production  plans are implemented,  a typical
(1967),  and Nerlove (1972).  The Almon lag struc-  supplier  formulates  expectations  of  future  prices
ture  is used in  Schmidt and  Waud (1973).  such that  his subjective  expected  price  equals  the
A rational distributed lag function is one that can  price that equates  demand and supply when output
be  written  as  the  ratio  of  two  polynomials:  one  is realized.
polynomial with  a finite number of lags in the de-  Following Wallis (1980),  Goodwin and Sheffrin
pendent variable  and  another for the  independent  (1982),  and  Huntzinger  (1979),  we  can  write  theBurton and Love  Alternative Expectations Regimes  217
supply  and demand equations given in (1) and (3)  where 4 i =  {t(i}. To obtain estimatable equations,
matrix form as  (17)  can  be  substituted  into  price  expectations
,y~e +r  +r  x-=v  function (16)  and that result can be substituted into
(14)  By,  +  At,_-  +  iw,_  +  F 2X  =  Vt,  the  structural  supply  and  demand,  equation  (14).
where A, B, r,  and r 2 are matrices  of parameters,  Combining terms  involving wt _ gives
0-Al  0  (18)  By,  - (A(A  + B)-'r  - rl)wt_
0  B  ='  1P  - (A  )-'rE_,A
A =  0J0= 1-1  1+  r 2xt  =  Vt.
r, =  ]-  'r 2 =  3  Econometric Estimation
y'  =  (yt  pt) is  a vector of the endogenous  output  Equation  (18)  represents a system of simultaneous
and price variables,  t_ y  is  a vector of the expec-  equations.  Wegge  and  Feldman  (1983)  have
tation  variables  for  output  and  price,  wt_ is  a  shown that  econometric  identification  of parame-
vector of exogenous  supply  variables  with values  ters  in rational expectations  models of this form  is
known at time t - 1,  and x;  =  (z', u') is a vector  guaranteed by  the traditional rank  and order con-
of exogenous  demand variables  with future values  ditions,  so long  as  the number of imperfectly  an-
not  known  at time  t  - 1. We  will  assume  that  ticipated  exogenous  variables  (elements  in  xt)  is
errors across equations may be contemporaneously  not  less  than  the  number of  equations  (elements
correlated,  but that errors  are not correlated across  in yt).  Assuming  the  errors  vt are  independent  of
time periods. Thus, E(Vt)  =  0 and E(VtV  =  X.  the  vt,  unknown  parameters  can  be  jointly  esti-
Solving equation  (14)  for yt gives  mated  using  nonlinear  full-information  maxi-
mum-likelihood  estimation procedures  with cross-
(15)  y,  =  - BA,_lyt  - B  Frlw t_ equation  parameter restrictions  on  equations  (17)
- B-  ' 2x t +  B-'V,.  and (18)  (Wallis  1980; Taylor 1979;  Fair and Tay-
lor 1983;  Revankar  1980). Equation  (15)  represents  reduced form  supply and  lr  1983;  Revankar  1980).
demand equations.  However,  this formulation still  Whle elements  in 4  can be esimated  as add-
involves unobserved expected prices and quantities  tional parameters  in (8),  as just describedo  fore-
for  pt, yt,  and x~,  at time  t  - 1. We  can  replace  parameters  in the  stochastic  process  used  to fore- for Pt,  yt,  and xt, at time t-  1. We can replace
cast  exogenous  demand  variables  are  estimated
these  unobserved  variables  by  taking  the  condi-  cast  exogenous  demand  variables  are  estimated
tional expectation  as of time t  - 1 (E~t - ) of both  separately, with resulting predictions being used as tional expectation  as of time t  - 1 (E,_,)  of both  ^  ^  ^  g  ^  Nonlinear  maximum-
sides  of equation  (15)  and  substituting  - for  instruments  for  EIx.  Nonlinear  maximu- sidese for  likelihood estimation is then applied to the simpli-
Et-  it  This results  in  fied version of (18). Pagan (1984)  develops a two-
(16)  t-_ly  =  -(A  +  B)-  rw t _ i  stage estimation procedure that can be used to ob-
- (A  +  B) -lr 2 Et_ xt.  tain  consistent  estimates  of  both  parameters  and
their estimated covariances.  Step 1 of the two-step
Equation  (16)  gives the  expected  price and  quan-  estimator consists of running regression (17)  to get
tity in period t, given information available  at time  i, then  substituting y, for  _ Iy  and x, for E,_ Ix
t  - 1, as  a function  of the model's  structural pa-  i  (16)  and  using  OLS  fitted  values  to  get ,
rameters,  known exogenous  supply variables,  and  Step 2 consists of substituting  _ 1-  for,_ iy  for x
forecasts  of exogenous  demand  variables  for  pe-  f  E__  x  in  (15)  and  estimating  (15)  using two-
riod t. This equation represents producers'  rational  stage  least  squares,  including  ,_  among  the
price expectations  function.  instrumental  variables.  Although  this  approach
To cast the rational  price  expectations  function  sacrifices  efficiency,  it reduces the number of non-
entirely in terms of observable values, it remains to  linear parameters  that must be simultaneously  es-
specify producers'  expectations  of exogenous  de-  timated and therefore  simplifies  estimation.  Hoff-
mand variables,  Et_ ix.  A common procedure is to  man  (1987)  has  extended Pagan's  estimation  pro-
specify producers'  expectations of exogenous vari-  cedure  to  the  multiple  equation  model.  Gauger
ables  as  low-order  autoregressions:  (1989)  has expanded Pagan's  work to analyze  the
effects  of generated regressors  on inference  in hy-
pothesis  testing.  The  two  estimation  approaches
(17)  xit  4tijXit-j  +  it,  just described  are often referred  to as the  "substi-
j=1  tution method"  because  they  substitute an expres-218  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
sion for expected  price directly  into  the  structural  Literature
model (Wickens  1982).
Fair  and  Taylor  (1983)  present  an  iterative  Agricultural models  estimated presuming the  sim-
method for obtaining maximum-likelihood  param-  ple rational price expectations model just described
eter  estimates  in  nonlinear  rational  expectations  include Huntzinger  (1979),  Goodwin and Sheffrin
models. Fair and Taylor's estimation procedure re-  (1982),  Shonkwiler and Emerson (1982),  Eckstein
places the rational  price expectation  function with  (1984),  Giles,  Goss,  and  Chin  (1985),  and  Te-
predicted values created from numerical model  so-  gene,  Huffman,  and  Miranowski  (1988).  Huntz-
lutions. Starting with a set of consistent parameter  inger estimates a rational expectations model of the
estimates,  the  model  is solved  using  an  iterative  U.S.  broiler  market  using  the errors-in-variables
solution  method.  Resulting  price  predictions  are  method  suggested  by  McCallum  (1976,  1979).
then  substituted  for  expected  price,  and  model  Giles,  Goss,  and  Chin use McCallum's  errors-in-
parameters  are  reestimated  using  maximum-like-  variables  method  to  estimate  simultaneous  equa-
lihood  estimation  procedures.  The  solution-  tions  models  of the  U.S.  corn and  soybean  mar-
estimation  process  continues  until  parameter  kets,  assuming  producers  follow  the  rational  ex-
convergence  is  achieved.  In  this  way,  Fair  and  pectations  hypothesis.  Eckstein  estimates  an
Taylor's  estimation procedure  incorporates  cross-  agricultural land allocation model,  presuming pro-
equation  restrictions  imposed from  rational  price  ducers  form  price  expectations  rationally,  using
expectations,  even  when  a  closed-form  solution  Wallis's  maximum  likelihood  procedure  (1980).
may  not  exist  for  the  rational  price  expectations  Goodwin  and  Sheffrin  use  Wallis's  MLE  proce-
function.  In linear  models,  Fair and Taylor's esti-  dure  to estimate  a rational  expectations  model  of
mation procedure  yields the  same results  as those  the  U.S.  broiler  market.  Tegene,  Huffman,  and
obtained through  maximum likelihood estimation.  Miranowski  use Wallis's  estimation  procedure  to
McCallum  (1976,  1979)  and  later  Wickens  estimate  a  rational  expectations  model  for  U.S.
(1982)  suggest  an  alternative  "ERrors  in  Vari-  corn  supply.  In  each  case,  parameter  estimates
ables"  (ERV)  estimation  method.  To  implement  give strong support to the underlying  model.
the ERV method,  expected values for price,  quan-
tity,  and  exogenous  demand  shifters  are replaced
with their realized (observed)  values.  Since x, is  a  Unobserved  Price  Expectations  and Producer
random variable correlated with vt, equation (18) is  Risk Aversion
now an  incomplete model  specification with more
jointly  dependent  variables  than  equations.  Esti-  In  this  section,  the  simple  aggregate  model  with
mation proceeds by augmenting  the redefined ver-  unobserved  price  expectations  presented  above  is
sion of (18)  with  modified  to  include  the  influence  of producers'
risk preferences  in determining  aggregate  supply.
(19)  xt =  0 It  +  t,,  Since farmers do not know  demand with certainty
when  the  output  decision  is  made,  they  cannot
where It is a vector of instrumental  variables,  0 is  know  expected price  with  certainty.  If producers
a  vector  of  parameters  and  ,t is  a  random  error  are risk averse,  then measures of risk variables  will
term.  The  model  is  now  completely  specified.  have  an  important  influence  on  production  deci-
Equations  (18)  and  (19)  can  be  estimated  using  sions (Sandmo  1971).
either  the  two-stage  least  squares  or  limited-  Including  risk  in  farmers'  supply  equations
information  maximum-likelihood  techniques.  means  farmers  must  form  expectations  on  both
While ERV  estimation  is not  asymptotically  effi-  price  and  price-induced  risk.  The  earliest models
cient,  the  efficiency  loss  may  be  small  in  small  included risk variables  in farmers'  production  de-
samples.  cisions  in  an  ad  hoc  way:  they  simply  added  an
Pesaran (1987,  ch.  6 and 7) considers  the econ-  additional  term  to  supply  representing  price  risk
ometric identification  and  estimation of numerous  (Behrman  1968;  Just 1974,  1977;  Traill  1978).  In
alternative model  specifications,  including  single-  these  models,  supply  is
equation  and  simultaneous-equation  specifica-  (2)  s 
tions,  with  current  and forward-looking  expecta-  +  t  +  a2Wt-
tions  of  endogenous  and  exogenous  variables.  + 
3 tPt  t
Asymptotic  distributions  and  consistent  variance-  where t- lpv is the expected price variance  at time
covariance  estimators  are  presented.  Pesaran  also  t, conditional  on information at time t - 1. While
discusses the relative  asymptotic  efficiency of the  most  authors  do  not  present  any  justification  for
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specification  as a supply  function resulting  from a  rational expectations  framework  have  been inves-
second-order  Taylor-series  approximation  of indi-  tigated by Antonovitz  and Roe  (1984,  1986),  An-
rect  utility  specified  as  a  function  of  expected  tonovitz  and Green  (1990),  Seale and  Shonkwiler
prices  and price variances.  While this justification  (1987),  Schroeter  and  Azzam  (1991),  Holt  and
is not necessarily incorrect,  it seems more natural  Aradhyula  (1990),  and Holt (1993).  In these mod-
that producers  maximize  expected utility  of prof-  els, expected price and expected price variance are
its.  In  this case,  the  mean and variance  terms  in  modeled  as forecasts  from auxiliary equations  us-
equation  (20)  should  be transformed  through  ex-  ing  time  series  methods.  Antonovitz  and  Roe
pected profit and variance of profit,  since profit is  (1984,  1986),  Antonovitz  and  Green (1990),  and
the argument  of utility.  In  the  event input prices  Seale  and  Shonkwiler  (1987)  generate  price  and
are  known  var(Tr)  =  (yS)
2 var(p)  (Pope  1978).  price  variance  forecasts  using  ARIMA  models.
With these assumptions,  the commonly used spec-  Price variances  are created  using lagged values of
ification  in (20)  is incorrect.  squared  residuals  from  their  respective  ARIMA
price models.  These forecasts  are then used as re-
Extrapolative Expectations Models  gressors  for  expected  prices  and  expected  price
variances  in structural supply  and demand  models
Adaptive Expectations. Behrman  (1968)  was  the  like  equations  (20)  and  (3).  Special  estimation
first  to adopt  a supply  specification  like  equation  problems  associated  with  this  model  formulation
(20).  He  used  a  fixed-length  moving  average  of  are considered  in Pagan  (1984)  and in  Pagan  and
squared  deviations  around  a simple  moving  aver-  Ullah  (1988).
age of the same  length as the measure of expected  Seale  and  Shonkwiler  (1987)  use the  substitu-
price variance t- tp', given the information at time  tion  estimation  procedure  suggested  by  Wallis
t  - 1.  Just (1974)  utilized  the adaptive  expecta-  (1980)  to  estimate  a  quasi-rational  expectations
tions  hypothesis  for  both  price  and  price  risk  to  model including risk for the U.S. watermelon mar-
estimate  supply  equation  (20).  To  operationalize  ket.  They  estimate  autoregressive  models  of  de-
price  risk, Just  used  the  standard  adaptive  expec-  gree  one  to produce  forecasts  of exogenous  vari-
tations specification for expected price, as in equa-  ables.  Then  they  substitute  these forecasts  into a
tion (9).  He then defined subjective  price risk as  structural model  to estimate the remaining  param-
eters.  Antonovitz  and  Green  (1990)  estimate  a
(21)  quasi-rational  expectations  model  including  price
risk  for  fed-beef  supply  also  using  Wallis's
P" =  (1  - )i(pt_  ti-p)
2 method.
=~t-  0~~ I1P,  ^\  >  Holt and Aradhyula  (1990) point out that using
an ARIMA process to estimate expected price vari-
where  ir is an unknown  parameter.  Just also con-  ance is  inconsistent  with the  homoskedastic  vari-
sidered the possibility that supply might be a func-  ance  assumption  of  the  ARIMA  model.  Instead,
tion of multiple  expected  prices,  possibly  includ-  they suggest using Engle's ARCH (Autoregressive
ing own-price  and  substitute prices  in production.  Conditional  Heteroskedasticity)  (1982)  or Boller-
Adaptive  expectations  of covariance  can be oper-  slev's GARCH (Generalized  ARCH)  (1986)  mod-
ationalized  through  equation  (21).  els to generate forecasts of expected price and  ex-
Just  (1974,  1977)  develops  a maximum  likeli-  pected price variance.  A distinguishing  feature  of
hood procedure for estimating (20) using the adap-  these models is that forecast variance  of a series is
tive expectations hypothesis for expected price and  allowed  to  vary  over  time.  The  ARCH  process
expected  price variance.  His procedure  transforms  conditions  variance  forecasts  on  past  realizations
the unobserved expectational variables  conditional  of the dependent  variable,  while the GARCH  pro-
on values of X and  7r by  building  price  series re-  cess  extends the information set  to include lagged
cursively  as  in  equation  (11).  Model  parameters  variances  of the dependent  variable.  Using a mod-
are  then  estimated  using  OLS.  A  grid  search  is  ified  GARCH  (1,1)  model  to  form  forecasts  of
performed  over X and  rr  to obtain their maximum  price and price variance,  Holt and  Aradhyula esti-
likelihood values. Empirical studies by Just (1974,  mate a supply model for the U.S. broiler industry.
1977),  Traill (1978),  Hurt and  Garcia (1982),  and  While  their  estimated  supply  equation  compares
Brorsen,  Chavas,  and  Grant  (1987)  have  found  favorably with one estimated using Just's adaptive
that risk terms  are  important  in aggregate  supply  expectations  framework,  the  question  of  which
functions.  model  is better is left unanswered.
Quasi-Rational Expectations with  Risk Aver-  A  number  of  authors  have  utilized  price  and
sion. The effects of price uncertainty  in the quasi-  price  variance  forecasts  from  ARCH  or GARCH220  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
processes  in  structural  models  of supply  and  de-  (26)  Byt - Al(B  +  A1)-'lwt,_
mand.  Structural  parameters  are  estimated  using  - A(B  +  Al)-lr 2Et  lxt
the  substitution  method  procedure  suggested  by  - A1(B  +  A  )-'A 2dia (B-  - r  'tF 2 B-'
Wallis  (1980)  or  using  the  instrumental  variable+ 
procedure  suggested  by  Pagan  (1984).  Schroeter  A d  -- )'  +  -l  -l
and Azzam  (1991)  use an ARCH process and Holt  + A2 iag(B  2It  I  B-'  +  B  )
(1993)  uses  a  multivariate  formulation  of  the  +  rlWt-1  +  F2Et-1X  t =  Vt.
GARCH  process  to  model  farm-to-retail  price
spreads with quasi-rational  risk averse  agents.  This  model  can  be  estimated  using  the  methods
outlined  in the econometric  estimation  of rational
Rational Expectations Models  expectations  models  above.  Pagan  (1984)  dis-
cusses  some  special  estimation  problems  associ-
ated  with  estimating  the  covariance  terms  in ar t. The effects of price uncertainty  in the rational ex-  Using  Fair  and  Taylor's  estimation  procedure
pectations  framework  have  been  investigated  by  (1983),  Aradhyula  and  Holt  (1989)  estimate  the
Aradhyula  and  Holt  (1989).  The  simple  rational  fully specified model given in equation (26) for the
expectations  model  represented  in  equation  (14)  U.S.  broiler market.
can be modified to include variance  by adding the  Rational  Expectations with Bounded Prices. Re-
term A2 t-  lyt.  Equation (14)  then becomes  cently Maddala  (1983),  Shonkwiler  and  Maddala
(1985),  Holt and Johnson (1989),  and Holt (1992)
(22)  Byt  +  Al  t  -lY  +  A2 t-lYv  have  considered  rational  expectations  models
+  'rlw,  +  r2xt  =  Vt'  where  prices  are  bounded.  Bounded  prices  often
Utilizing  the rational  expectations  hypothesis,  the  arise in agricultural markets where government  in-
price risk specification  is derived from underlying  tervenes  to guarantee producers a minimum price.
model parameters.  Following Aradhyula  and Holt,  If market price  is above the  support level,  produc-
the  rational  expectation  of  variance  can  be  de-  ers get the prevailing market price and government
fined as  takes no action in the market.  If market price falls
below the support price,  government  intervenes in
(23)  t-lYt  =  diag{E,_-[(y, - Et-l(ytlft-O)]  the  market  by  purchasing  commodities  to  raise
[Yt - Et-  (Ytl  [- 1  )]'},  price to support level. Hence,  the market alternates
where  -,_iy  is  defined  as  a  vector  of  expected  between equilibrium  and  disequilibrium.  Govern-
variances for relevant endogenous variables  condi-  ment intervention creates  an effective lower bound
tional on information  avail  t  poducers'  ration availabl  price  expectat  time t-  1.  ions and  cre-
exact  expression  for  equation  (23)  is  formed  in  ates a  situation where no  closed-form solution  for
three  steps.  Step  1 is  to  find  an  expression  for  the rational  price  expectations  function,  equation
t_lye as  in  equation  (16).  Step  2  is  to  subtract  (16)  exists.
,_ ye from the  reduced form  representation  of y,  Maddala  (1983)  proposes  a two-stage  tobit esti-
(a modified form of equation (15):  mator  to  deal  with  the  two price  regimes.  In  the
first  stage,  a  tobit model  is  used  to  obtain  price
(24)  (y,  - t_  Y)  =  - B-  F2(xt - Et_ x)  predictions.  In  the second  stage,  expected price is
+  B- 1V . replaced with price predictions from the tobit equa-
tion,  and two-stage  least squares  estimation  is  ap-
Step 3 is to  use the result from step 2 to compute  plied  to  an  augmented  structural  supply  and  de-
t-  ly  from equation (23).  These steps result in the  mand model.  Additional terms  are included  in the
rational  expectations  predictor  of variances  of en-  estimating equation to correct for nonspherical  dis-
dogenous  variables:  turbances.  Maddala's  estimation  procedure  pro-
(25)  -lyr  = diag(B-lr2lpr'B-i'  duces  consistent  but  inefficient  parameter  esti-
)+  B_  1 a  B'I't'  mates. Shonkwiler and Maddala (1985)  assume the
"+ B-11B  )  producers  have  perfect  foresight  with  respect  to
where  "I, is the  variance-covariance  matrix  asso-  periods when price supports are effective.  This as-
ciated with  the  predictions  of demand  shifters xt. sumption  allows them to use  standard  substitution
Equation (25)  can now  be substituted  into  the ex-  estimation procedures.  They compare perfect fore-
pression  for  t,_yt  to  eliminate  terms  involving  sight results with Maddala's two-step tobit estima-
t-  Y.  Together t-  ly  and t_- y  can be substituted  tor. Holt and Johnson  (1989) and Holt (1992) both
into equation  (22) to obtain the following  estimat-  use  Fair  and  Taylor's  estimation  procedure  de-
able  system of equations:  scribed  earlier,  which  is  directly  adapted  to  theBurton and Love  Alternative Expectations  Regimes  221
numeric  formulation  of  the  price  expectations  model given in (27)  and jointly testing the restric-
function.  tions  (Hoffman  and  Schmidt,  1981):
(28)  Ho:  Gi  =  -A(A  +  B)-'r,  +  F,  and
G2 =  -A(A  +  B)-  r2 Selecting  Expectations  Regimes  When
Expected  Price Is Not  Observed  versus
(29)  Ha:  G 1 #  -A(A  +  B)-'r,  +  F, or
When expectations  are not observed,  two catego-  G2 #  -A(A  +  B) -1 2.
ries  of tests  are  available  to  evaluate  a particular  Goodwin  and  Sheffrin  (1982)  apply  the likeli-
price expectations hypothesis with respect to actual  hood ratio test  to a model  of the  U.S.  broiler in-
market  data.  The  first  is  for  consistency  of  the  dustry  and  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that
expectations  mechanism  within  the  structural  price expectations are formed rationally.  However,
model.  Tests  in  this  category  simply  ascertain  . . model.  Tests  in  this  category  simply  ascertain  it should be noted that tests  like the ones above are
whether the expectations  mechanism is  consistent  conditional on  the correct  specification of the un-
with observed behavior  as  constructed  in the eco-  structural  model. derlying structural  model.
nomic  model.  The  second  category  consists  of
nonnested  model selection  tests designed to allow  Testing across Expectations Regimes  Using
the  researcher  to  select  the  expectations  regime  Nonnested Tests
that best fits agent behavior in a particular market.
As discussed in the introduction,  when information
Testin  for  .TT  C  c  collection  and  processing  are  costly,  any  number
Testing for Within-Model  Consistency  of expectations  mechanisms can potentially reflect
a producer's  actual  expectations.  Several  authors
Extrapolative Expectations. Naive  and  adaptive  have investigated  this possibility  in various  com-
price  expectations  mechanisms  do  not  impose  modity  markets  (Goodwin  and  Sheffrin  1982;
cross-equation  parameter  restrictions  on  supply  Orazem  and  Miranowski  1986;  Antonovitz  and
and  demand  equations.  Therefore,  in  contrast  to  Green  1990).  A  number  of nonnested  hypothesis
rational  expectations  models,  there  are  no  direct  tests  are  available  for  distinguishing  which  price
tests of internal  consistency  that will reject  or fail  expectations  regime  producers  are  actually  utiliz-
to reject naive expectations  when expectations  are  ing
not directly  observed.  Alternative  expectations  models  can  be  artifi-
A weak  test for  within-model  validity  of adap-  cially  nested  to  determine  whether  any  hypothe-
tive  expectations,  in  the  absence  of  directly  ob-  sized  expectations  regime  dominates  all  other
served expectations,  is whether  X lies  on the  unit  specifications.  Care must be taken to maintain the
interval.  same  production  and  demand  structures  so  that
Rational Expectations. The  rational  expecta-  only  the parameterization  of each  expectation  re-
tions hypothesis imposes  cross-equation  structural  gime differs  between models.  Selection of the ex-
restrictions on model parameters.  If the restrictions  pectation  regime  consistent  with  behavioral  data
imposed  by  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  can  then  be  based  on  model  specification  tests,
cannot  be rejected,  the  rational  expectations  hy-  including  Davidson  and  MacKinnon's  J-test
pothesis cannot be rejected. The statistical validity  (1981),  Mizon and  Richard's  encompassing  prin-
of  cross-equation  parameter  restrictions  imposed  ciple  (1986),  and  Pollak  and  Wales's  likelihood
by  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  can  be  dominance criterion  (1991).
evaluated through standard  hypothesis testing pro-  J-test. Suppose  there are two competing  expec-
cedures  (Hoffman  and  Schmidt  1981;  Revankar  tations hypotheses:  t_  pe,  (adaptive expectations)
1980).  A likelihood-ratio  test can be computed by  and ,_  l2,  (rational  expectations).  Assuming that
estimating the restricted  model using the  substitu-  the first price expectations hypothesis is true,  t-  _
tion  method  maximum-likelihood  estimator  and  =  tit,  the null  hypothesis  can be written  as
estimating  the unrestricted  model  using  standard
FIML, where the unrestricted model is given by:  (30)  Ho: yt  =  (ao  +  i  t-  ,pit  +  tw2t-  1
+  Vs,  =  XAI  +  vS  t
(27)  By t +  Gwt_,  +  G2E_,xt +  r 2xt =  Vt. 
versus  the  alternative  hypothesis  that  t-lPt
The number of restrictions  is equal to  the number  _  e  .
of parameters  in equation  (27)  minus  the  number  e  ,
of  parameters  in  (18).  Alternatively,  a Wald  test  (31)  Ha:  =  +  2  t-lP2,t +  i2wt-
can  be  constructed by  estimating  the  unrestricted  +  v'2,  =  ZA2 +  v2,t.222  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Since Ha cannot be written  as  a restriction on H0,  wise comparisons  are,  as in Antonovitz  and Green,
nested hypothesis tests are not possible.  However,  inconclusive  and conflicting.
Davidson  and MacKinnon (1981)  suggest combin-  Encompassing Principle. Other  nonnested  test
ing the  alternative models into a single  compound  procedures are also available for testing alternative
model:  model  specifications,  including  Mizon  and  Rich-
ard's  encompassing  test  (1986)  and  Pollak  and
(32)  yt  =  (1  - 8)XAi  +  SZA2 +  Vt.  Wales's  likelihood  dominance  criterion  (1991).
A  test of 8  =  0 would be  a test against  Ha.  How-  Mizon and  Richard's  encompassing  test is  a joint
ever,  8 cannot be estimated directly using equation  test that  compares  A2 and  variance of the  regres-
(32).  Davidson  and MacKinnon  suggest  first esti-  sion 62 obtained under Ha from equation (27) with
mating  A2 using a maximum likelihood  estimator  the  probability  limits  of  these  parameters  under
and then performing  maximum  likelihood estima-  Ho.  Comparing  A2 with  plim  (A21Ho)  gives  the
tion on the aggregate  model:  mean  encompassing  test;  it  is  equivalent  to  an
F-test for equality  of model coefficients.  Compar-
(33)  y'  =  (1  - 8)XA,  +  8ZA2 +  Vt.  ing  &2 with plim  ((6  Ho)  gives  the  variance  en-
An  asymptotically  valid test of t-  p  =  -_  ,t is  compassing test; equivalent to the J-test. Hence,  as
Ho:  8  =  0  with the test  statistic given by  a joint test of mean and  variance,  the encompass-
ing test is a more general test than the J-test alone.
Likelihood Dominance Criterion. Consider  the
(34)  SE(S)  N(0,1).  two  hypotheses  Ho and  Ha  in  equations  (30)  and
(31),  and  a fictional  composite  hypothesis  Hc that
This test is conditional  on the truth of the  hypoth-  nests  Ho and Ha.  Let L0, La and  Lc denote  the log
esis  t-lPt  =  t-  Piet; we  cannot infer the truth of  likelihood values associated  with each  hypothesis.
Ha  from 8.  However,  the process can be reversed  Let C(v) denote the critical values of the chi-square
so  that  t_ 1Pt  =  t-  Pt  is taken  as  the  truth.  In  distribution with v degrees of freedom  and a fixed
total,  four  possibilities  must  be  checked:  reject  significance level. Using a likelihood-ratio test, Hi
both Ho and Ha; reject neither Ho nor Ha; reject Ho (i =  0 or a) cannot be rejected when tested  against
but not Ha;  reject  Ha but  not Ho. the composite if and only if 2(Lc  - Li) < C(nc  -
Orazem  and  Miranowski  (1986),  using  Iowa  n,)  where  ni is the  number  of parameters  in  Hi.
county-level  acreage data for corn,  soybeans,  hay,  Using  this relationship,  Pollak  and  Wales  (1991)
and  oats,  construct the J-test for three  alternative  show  that Ha dominates  Ho if and only if
expectations  regimes:  naive,  perfect  foresight  (35)  L  - Lo  >  [C(n,  - n)  - C(n,  - na)/2
(r-lPt  =  Pt),  and  quasi-rational  expectations.  =  C*(nc  n o ,  na).
They find that,  while  quasi-rational  forecasts per-
form marginally better than the other regimes, they  Since  nc  is not known,  Pollak and  Wales develop
cannot  accept  any  of the  postulated  expectations  rules  for establishing  a model  selection  criterion,
hypotheses.  the likelihood  dominance criterion  (LDC):
Antonovitz  and  Green  (1990)  apply  Davidson  (i) the  LDC prefers  Ho to Ha if
and  MacKinnon's J-test to six alternative  expecta-
tions  models for  price  and  price  variance:  naive,  (36)  La  - Lo <  [C(na  +  1)  - C(no  +  1)]/2,
two  quasi-rational  models,  futures  prices,  adap-  (i)  the LDC  is indecisive  between Ho  and Ha  if
tive,  and  rational  expectations.  Pair-wise  test  re-
sults do not consistently support any particular ex-  (37)  [C(n  +  1) - C(1)/2  > L  -Lo
pectations  specification  over  any  other,  with  the  >  [C(n  +  1)  -C(n  +  )/2,
least  support  for the  adaptive  expectations.  Root  and,  (iii) the  LDC prefers  Ha  to Ho if
mean-squared  errors  (RMSE)  are  also  computed  (38)  L  - >  [C(n  +  1) -C()]/2
for  each  expectations  mechanism.  Interestingly,
rational  expectations  generate  the highest  RMSE,  Since La,  Lo, na and no are all known, the LDC test
while adaptive  expectations  generate  the lowest.  is easily  implemented.
Shideed  and White  (1989) also use  the J-test to  Summary.  Neither Antonovitz and Green (1990)
compare  six  alternative  expectation  formulations  nor  Shideed  and  White  (1989)  could  support  any
for  prices  of corn  and  soybeans:  naive,  futures  particular  expectations  specification  using  the
prices,  effective  expected support prices,  a combi-  J-test. Likewise,  Orazem and Miranowski's results
nation  of lagged cash  and  support prices,  a com-  (1986)  were  inconclusive,  finding  only  marginal
bination  of  futures  prices  and  lagged  support  support for the quasi-rational  expectations hypoth-
prices,  and a Koyck lag model.  The results of pair-  esis. However,  nonnested tests have relatively lowBurton and Love  Alternative Expectations Regimes  223
power,  and  inconclusive  results  are  not  unusual  power of the  rationally  expected  price.  Goodwin
(Judge et al. 1985, 885).  Neither the encompassing  and  Sheffrin  argue  that  futures  market  price  data
principle  nor  the  likelihood  dominance  criterion  should include all available information in the mar-
has yet been used to distinguish price expectations  ketplace.  Hence,  a test of the rational  expectations
mechanisms.  hypothesis  can  be  performed  using  regression
model
Forecast  Performance  Measures  (40)  Pt = ao  + atl t-iPt  +  ( 2 t-it  +  E,,
where Pt is realized  price,  t-  ,_  is the price  fore-
Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) construct two tests to  cast through the rational  price expectations  mech-
compare  alternative  expectations  regimes:  a  pre-  anism for time t given the information at time t -
diction test and  a futures  market test.  These  tests  i,  and  t- it  is  the future  price  at time  t  - i  for
are  valid  only  for the maintained  null hypothesis  delivery  at time t. If the rational  expectations  hy-
that expectations  are formed rationally.  pothesis is valid, Ho will not be rejected:  Ho: ao =
Predictive R2 . Goodwin  and Sheffrin's predic-  a 2 =  0.  o1 is not required  to equal  1 because of
tion test (1982)  is based on the relative predictive  transportation  costs from  a local  market to a con-
efficiency  of  rationally  formed  expectations  that  tract  delivery  point  and  because  product  form
use  all  available  information versus  less efficient  (e.g.,  iced broiler meat versus  live chickens)  may
extrapolative  price  expectations  models  that  use  differ between  cash price pt and futures  price pf.
information  contained  only in  past  prices.  Pierce  Goodwin and Sheffrin  (1982) estimate  equation
(1975)  defines a measure  of this efficiency  called  (40) using OLS  and cannot reject the rational price
"the  predictive R+":  expectations  hypothesis.  However,  in  general,
MSE~  - MSE*  '-ti  will  estimate  t-i/P  with  error.  If t-_P  =
2  MSE  - MSE*  w (39)  R+  =  t- iP' +  t,  where  It is  a random  error term pos-
+ MSE  '  sibly  correlated  with  et,  OLS  estimations  of (40)
E  is the extrapolative mean squared error  will be biased and  inconsistent.  In addition,  since
andwher MSE  is  the  rational  expectations  mean  futures market prices are contained in the informa-
squared  M  error.  R  measures  the  proportion  tion set used in forming rational expectations,  it is
+ eeo  ar  hpproo  not clear  whether  Goodwin  and Sheffrin's  test  is
variation in a variable that is generated by utilizing  a  rate  Pagan  (1984)  suggests  estimating the
structural information versus  variation in the vari-  a  oate. Pagan  (  sggests estiti  te
able  generated  using  only  own-price  history.  in  g  the two-step  approach detailed above. 
Goodwin and Sheffrin estimate models of the U.S. 
broiler  market using adaptive,  quasi-rational,  and Summary
rational price expectations  regimes.  Using the R 
criterion, they  find superior efficiency in the ratio-  Not  surprisingly,  empirical  results  concerning
nal expectations  hypothesis. However,  they do not  which price expectations  mechanisms are  actually
test for  unbiasedness,  another requirement  of the  being  used  are  inconclusive.  Inability  of these
rational expectations  hypothesis.  models to distinguish actual producer price expec-
Although  widely used,  forecast  evaluation tests  tations  mechanisms  may  result from  aggregation
are  valid  only  for  a  maintained  null  of  rational  bias. When information is costly,  information sets
expectations.  Unbiasedness  and efficiency  are ba-  differ,  and individuals begin the expectations  pro-
sic  tenets  of the rational  expectations  hypothesis.  cess  with  different  educational  and  analytic  en-
Therefore, if producers'  expectations are biased or  dowments,  it is  not reasonable  to  suppose  an ag-
inefficient, they are not rationally generated.  How-  gregate  "representative  farmer"  price  expecta-
ever,  there  is  no  such  accuracy  or efficiency  re-  tions  model  will  be  valid.  If  producers  have
quirement for other expectations mechanisms. The  heterogeneous  expectations,  then  an  aggregate
predictive  ability  of  an  expectations  mechanism  model may not capture  reality well enough to pro-
might  be the  deciding  factor  when  information  is  vide  good  statistical  results.  In particular,  strong
unlimited  and costless.  However,  when  informa-  assumptions are made in the use of aggregate data.
tion is costly, a farmer may choose a biased or less  Tests  of  producer  expectations  mechanisms  then
efficient  mechanism.  incorporate  these assumptions  as part of the main-
Futures Market. Goodwind and Sheffrin (1982)  tained  hypothesis of model structure.
also construct a rational  expectations test based on  For example, to derive a simple structural model
futures  market data.  According  to the  rational ex-  with  stochastic  output prices  that admits  the pos-
pectations  hypothesis,  no  information  available  at  sibility  of risk  aversion  similar  to  equation  (20)
the time of the forecast should add to the predictive  requires numerous assumptions.  First, assume that224  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
price  is  normally  distributed  and  that  farmer  i's  gregate.  Agents must hypothesize  aggregate  mod-
utility  is  characterized  by  constant  absolute  risk  els based on the information at hand and will likely
aversion.  Maximizing  expected  utility  is  then  consider their own technologies  and utilities.  Indi-
equivalent  to maximizing  the certainty  equivalent  viduals  may  aggregate  supply  by presuming  that
of profit E[U(Tai)] (Hildreth  1954;  Freund  1956):  technology,  information,  and  risk attitudes  of  all
other producers are the same as their own. Farmers
Al___  might  also  believe  that  others  in  the  market  are
(41)  E[U(Ti)] = E(rrTi) - 2  forming their expectations  rationally and will fore-
cast the same price  and price variance  as they do.
where E(ri)  is expected profit and (-.  is the profit  These  or similar assumptions  are necessary for ra-
variance perceived by farmer i. Alternatively,  Far-  tional  expectations  models.
rar (1962)  and  others  have justified  equation  (41)  Given  these assumptions,  ci(w t_ )  =  c(wt,_),
as  a Taylor-series  expansion  of the utility  of ex-  hi = X, ,t-  = t-1t,  and t-pit  =  t-,_t.  As  a
pected profit.  result, aggregate  supply is the sum over individual
Equation  (41)  can be expanded to  supplies
(42)  (44)
M  M
E[U(qrit) ] =  t-IPetit - Ci(yitwt-i;F)  Yt  t-iP  (w-) 
Yi  2  t-[pt -i  2Y  i=1  i=1  t-iPt -2  Yit t-l,  '  '-
t-Pt  - C(Wt-I)  M  -
where  t-lPie  is  farmer  i's  expected  price,  it is  Yt  = M  - +  M
farmer i's output, Ci(y,  wt; F) is his cost function,  h t-lPt  t-lPt
and  F is fixed inputs.  In order to aggregate  across  where M is the number of producers  and  is the
producers,  cost functions  must be either identical  mean  error term  with an expected  value  of zero. mean  error term  with an expected  value  of zero.
or of some aggregatable  form such  as the Grman  To  form  rational  expectations,  producers  must
polar form,  Cit =  yitci(w,_,)  +  F.  also know aggregate demand, equation (3).  Aggre-
Each  farmer  chooses  yi  to  maximize  expected  gate  supply can then  be combined with  aggregate
utility of profits:  demand  to form  model-consistent  price  and price
(43)  variance expectations.  While little  is known about
how producers  might actually  perform these com-
aE[U(rit)]  e  putations,  it  is  clear  that  numerous  assumptions
-y  t-Pit - i(Wt-_)  -YitXi  t-iPit  must be  maintained  in  the estimation  of  rational
expectations  models.
Eit,  To investigate the possibility that producers may
where eit is  a small error with mean zero resulting  have heterogenous  price expectations,  we now turn
from  errors  in  specifying  the  true  optimization  our attention to studies focused  on discovering in-
problem  (McElroy  1987).  If  firm-level  data  are  dividuals'  price  expectations  mechanisms.  To
available  for  input  prices  and  output  quantity,  date,  studies concerning  individuals'  price  expec-
equation (43)  can be estimated  to recover the util-  tations  have  been  based  solely  on  survey  data.
ity parameter hi and technology  parameters  in c,(.)  First,  we  review  some  test  procedures  used  in
by  substituting  in  an  agent's expectation  mecha-  panel  data  studies.  Then  we  consider  some  new
nism for price and price variance.  Substituting ex-  test  procedures  that  could  be  implemented  when
trapolative  price  expectations  mechanisms  into  firm-level  data,  including  price  expectations  sur-
(43)  is straightforward.  No other assumptions  are  veys,  are available.
necessary.
However,  in  the  case  of rational  expectations,  Selecting  Expectations  Regimes  When
producers'  price  expectations  are  the  objective  Expected Price Is Observed
price  expectations  from  the  market  given  their
information  sets  at  production  planning  time.  One of the pitfalls of hypothesis tests within struc-
Though  expectations  are  formed  individually,  an  tural models  is that it is nearly impossible  to sep-
aggregate  model is required.  Rational expectations  arate  errors  in  the  expectations  mechanism  from
requires each individual to assess aggregate  supply  errors that exist in the structural model (Jacobs and
and  demand conditions  and  to  forecast  price  and  Jones  1980).  Hypothesis testing within the context
price  variance based on his perception  of that  ag-  of a structural model  is necessarily  conditional  onBurton and Love  Alternative Expectations  Regimes  225
model structure,  presenting a serious limitation for  larger than  the expected  price variance.  This sug-
testing the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  within  gests  a second test:  var(p,)  >  var(,_pi).
the  structural  model  context.  As  an  alternative,  Third,  the  "weak rationality"  concept  (Nelson
several  authors  have  turned to  direct  tests of un-  and Bessler  1992;  Sargent  1982;  Lovell  1986) im-
derlying  price  expectations  that  use  survey  data.  plies that the  error term  et should  be uncorrelated
Some tests use aggregate  (mean) survey  measures  with the information available in historic price lev-
of expectations,  while others  use  individual panel  els  at the  time the forecast  is  made.  This hypoth-
data.  esis can be tested using the regression  equation
When  expectations  are observed,  as in the case
where survey  data exist, direct tests to distinguish  (48)  Pi =  o +  11 r-iPP  +  l12 Pt-i +  Vt,
economic  agents'  expectations  mechanisms  are  where  'To,  Al  and  T12  are  parameters  and ut is  an
possible.  For instance,  a direct test  of naive  price  error  term. A third hypothesis  test for rational ex-
expectations is to obtain regression coefficients  for  pectations  is thus  Ho:  Tr2 =  0.
the model  A  variation  of the  weak  rationality  hypothesis
e  _  +  test  is  presented  by Pesando  (1975).  He  suggests
(45)  ,-iPt =  0o+  Pt-_  + 1t,  running  the  following  two regressions:
where ut - N(0,c2) and the expected price t_ ipe is
taken directly  from the  survey  data.  A hypothesis  (49)  Pt  =  XIPt--1  +  o-2Pr-2 + 
test for naive expectations  is Ho:  o 0 =  0 and (x  =  +  onptn + vlt
1 versus Ha: oo 0 #  0 or ota  1 1. Failure to reject Ho  and
means  that  the  surveyed  price  expectations  are
consistent with the  naive price expectations mech-  (50)  ,_tP  =  3Pt-1 +  [3 2Pr-2
+
anism.  _pe  nPt anism.  .+  . nPt-n  +
-
2 ,t, Adaptive  expectations  are a special  case of ex-
trapolative  expectations  where  t(i,  and  Pi are parameters  and  vi are  error
terms.  If expectations  are weakly  rational,  then an
•x4.:6)~ ,p  F-test will not reject the null hypothesis  Ho:  cxt =
(46)  t-P t=  ,  '  ()Pt-  P1,  O 2 =  2,  2.  an =  Pn  All information used
%Pt-^  '~  in the expected price and the realization is captured
J='  in  the  historic  price.  Carlson  (1977)  suggests  a
where  the  wj's  are  geometrically  declining  similar test.
weights.  There is no direct test for adaptive expec-  The F-test requires  that errors v1 and v2 be iden-
tations  since  no  hypothesis  can  be  constructed  tically  and  independently  distributed.  Pesando
from survey data alone to test whether the data are  (1975)  acknowledges,  and Mullineaux  (1978) fur-
consistent with the adaptive expectations hypothe-  ther  argues,  that  there  are  reasons  to  believe  the
sis.  errors  in equations  (49)  and  (50)  will  not be  ho-
moskedastic.  Mullineaux  suggests  that  Bartlett's
Rational Expectations  statistic  testing  variance  homogeneity  is  a  neces- Rational Expectations sary  companion  to Pesando's  and  Carlson's  tech-
niques.
Several tests are available to determine whether the  Recently,  the problem of possible nonstationar-
rational expectations  mechanism is consistent with  ity of Pt and ,-  ip  has  received  attention.  Fischer
survey  data.  First,  the  rational  expectations  hy-  (1989)  develops  several  necessary  conditions  for
pothesis implies that expected prices  should be un-  survey data to be generated from rational forecasts.
biased.  The restriction  can  be  checked  using  the  He  argues  that preliminary tests for unit roots  and
regression  equation  cointegration  are crucial  before  rationality  of sur-
Pe  vey  data can be established  and recommends  first
(47)  Pt =  To  +  TI  E (47)  P=  To  +  TI  t-  iPt  +  et,  testing  the order of integration  for t_ ipt  and p,. If
where To  and T'  are  parameters  and e,  is  an error  pt  - I(c),  t_-p  -I(d) and  c  #  d,  where  I(d)
term with E(e)  =  0.  Testing for unbiased expec-  indicates  order of integration, then  _  - lp  cannot be
tations  means  testing  Ho:  To  =  0,  TI  =  1 (Fried-  a rational forecast of  p.  If  _ Pt,  Pt  -I(d) and d >
man  1980).  0, then cointegration  between  t_  -pe  and pt can be
Second, for Muth rational expectations,  et must  tested.  If the data series  are cointegrated,  tests for
be  uncorrelated  with  the  expected  price  ,-lp'-  weak-form  rational expectations can be performed
Since the error term is correlated  with the realized  using residuals of the constrained cointegration re-
price,  Pt,  the  realized  price  variance  should  be  gression. Failure to pretest for unit roots may result226  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
in  invalid  inference  concerning  tests  for  weak-  (55)  F,+k = %o +  o  t,+kFe +  r  xt +  E,,
rationality.  Engsted  (1991)  tests for rationality  in  w  e 
where F,+, are actual farrowings  at t +  k,, +, survey data of inflation expectations  in the United  k  a  c 
are farmers'  planned farrowings  for t  +  k at time Kingdom using the cointegration approach.  By us Kingdom using the cointegration approach  By us-  are farmers'  planned  farrowings  for t  + k at time
ing cointegration  and en  t  s  t, and x, is a vector of variables containing forecast ing cointegration and error-correction  techniques,i  information  at  time  t.  Parameters  aot, oi,a and  P Engsted  shows that weak-rationality  cannot be re-  . . m  s  '
.Jected.  can be consistently  estimated using Hansen's gen-
jected.ni~~~~~  1-  101i.  eralized-method-of-moments  estimator  (1982). Mullineaux  (1978)  further suggests  another test  eralized-etodo  oents  estimor 
for  wk r  l.  E  s  ()  ad ()  cn  Runkle's  strong  rationality  test requires  orthogo- for  weak rationality.  Equations  (49)  and  (50)  can
be combined  through  subtraction:  nality of estimated regression residuals  to each re- be combined  through  subtraction: gressor  in the model.  Results  indicate  that neither
(51)  (p, -p P-)  =  the  one-quarter-ahead  nor  the  two-quarters-ahead
farrowing  intentions are rational forecasts of actual
((a0 - Po)  +  (o  - PI)Pt-i +  (ax 2 - 12)Pt-2  farrowings.
+  ..  +  (an - 3n)Pt-n +  (V  -v 2),  Eales et al. (1990) use survey data from farmers
or  and grain merchandisers to investigate the extent to
which  subjective  respondent's  price  distributions
(52)  Ap,  =  80  +  8lPt-1  +  82Pr-2  reflect  actual  futures  and  options  price  distribu-
+  · · · +  AnPt-n  +  (.  tions.  Not  surprisingly,  they  find  agreement  be-
Weak rationality implies that 60  = 8  =  82  =  ..  tween  respondent's  expected  price  and  futures
=  8,  =  0.  Mullineaux's  formulation specifically  price.  However,  they  also find strong evidence  of
allows  a constant term and  allows nested  hypoth-  systematic disagreement  between  respondents  and
esis testing.  the  market with respect to  variance forecasts.
Fourth,  "strong  rationality"  (Lovell  1986)  re-
quires that the error term be uncorrelated  with any  Panel Data Studies and Some Pitfalls
piece  of information  available  at  the  time  of the
forecast whether  or not  this information has  been  There are a number of possible  difficulties in test-
captured  in past prices.  This rationality concept is  ing  for  rational  expectations  using  survey  data.
also  called  "sufficient  expectations"  (Lovell  Keane and Runkle (1990)  maintain that most tests
1986)  since expectations  must be based on all  in-  in the literature are incorrect.  First, they assert that
formation  available  at the time the expected price  the  use  of  average  survey  responses  rather  than
is  formed.  One  hypothesis  test  for  this  involves  individual  micro  data can bias  hypothesis tests  by
estimating  leading  to  false rejection  of the rational  expecta-
(53)  , -p  = f(X,  p )  +  e  tions hypothesis.  Individual forecasts are necessar-
'  '  "  ^~  '  ~  ily predicated  on different information sets.  Thus,
and  tests based on aggregated data,  such as an average
(^  _  ~54)~  -~  X~  n  +survey  response,  are conditional  on a set of infor-
(54)  P, = f(X,,  [2)  e+  ,t,  mation  sets,  not  a single  shared  information  set.
where  P1 and p2  are  parameter sets,  X,  is an  in-  Aggregation nullifies the single information set as-
formation  set,  and  E t ,  E t are error  terms.  For ex-  sumption  required  for expectations  to be strongly
pectations  to be rational  in a  structural model,  the  rational.  As  a  result,  standard  tests  for  expecta-
expected  price  must  be related  to  the  exogenous  tions'  unbiasedness  might be falsely accepted.  Al-
variables in the same  way as the realized  price.  In  ternatively,  aggregation  may  lead  to  a failure  to
other  words,  the  two  variables  must  follow  the  reject the rational  expectations hypothesis because
same  autoregressive  process  (Turnovsky  1970).  aggregation  may  mask  individual  forecaster's  bi-
The test  is  thus  H0: p,  =  12. While  Turnovsky  ases.
performs this test using time series analysis,  a sim-  Aggregation  bias  may  also  result  from  using
ilar test could be implemented  for structural mod-  pooled  cross-sectional  time-series  expectations
els  where  equations  (53)  and  (54)  are  taken  as  survey  data.  Goodfriend  (1992)  points  out  that
price-dependent  supply  equations.  Abel  and  agents  have  randomly  heterogeneous  and  imper-
Mishkin  (1983) present an integrated view  of tests  fectly informed expectations.  In pooled panel data
for rational  expectations  and show the equivalence  studies,  this  may  result in  a stochastic  regressor
of many of the above  procedures.  problem arising  from correlation  between  the sur-
Runkle  (1991)  tests for strong  rationality  using  veyed  price expectation  and error  term.  Adapting
aggregate  U.S.  sow farrowing  data.  He  estimates  aggregate  supply equation (1) to pooled panel data
the model  gives  farmer i's supply  equation:Burton and Love  Alternative Expectations Regimes  227
(56)  yi  = aO  +  ai t-ei  + 02Wti  +  e,  from survey evidence  are conditional on the survey
quality  (Keane  and Runkle  1990).
where  a',  ai,  and  a2 are  parameters  for  agent  i,  Keane  and  Runkle  (1990),  Lovell  (1986),  Pe-
t_  -pe  is the price  expected by  agent  i,  wt_ is  a  sando (1975),  Carlson (1977),  Mullineaux  (1978),
vector of input prices,  ort  is a vector of parameters  Knobl (1974),  Nerlove  (1983), Colling,  Irwin,  and
common for all agents,  and  e'  is an error  term.  If  Zulauf (1992),  Frankel  and  Froot  (1987),  Runkle
the  number  of time-series  observations  is  large,  (1991),  and Eales  et  al.  (1990)  have  used  survey
and  conditions  Cov(, t _ p  Ei  ,  e')  =  0  and  data  to  test  price  expectations  regimes.  Holden,
Cov(wt_ ,e)  = 0 hold,  OLS  will produce consis-  Peel,  and  Thompson  (1985),  and  more  recently
tent parameter estimates for al, a2, and a3 and  ct 2 Zarnowitz  (1992,  ch.  16),  review numerous  stud-
for  each  individual.  However,  in  the  usual  case  ies  that  test  expectations  formation  of  macroeco-
where  the  observations  per  individual  are  few,  nomic  variables  including  inflation  and  interest
consistent  parameter estimates  require  the  et's  be  rates  using survey  data. Most studies narrowly fo-
uncorrelated  across  individuals  as  well.  In  the  cus on testing the rational expectations hypothesis,
strong rational  expectations  case,  the  et's  are un-  though Knobl (1974),  Nerlove (1983),  and Frankel
correlated  across  time for  a particular individual,  and  Froot (1987)  do  consider  other mechanisms.
but there is no condition on errors across agents. In  Generally,  survey-based  tests  of  the rational  ex-
fact, continual  small shocks  to the economy make  pectations  hypothesis  reject  unbiasedness:  the
it  highly  likely  that  the  ','s will  be  correlated  weakest requirement  for rationality.  Other studies
across  agents,  which  will  cause  information-  fail to reject  stronger forms  of the rational  expec-
aggregation  bias  in  models  using  pooled  panel  tations  hypothesis.  This  ambiguity  of  results  has
data.  led Lovell  (1986) to suggest that alternative  expec-
One possible  method to  deal with information-  tations  mechanisms  be  evaluated  against  each
aggregation  bias  is  suggested  by  Zeldes  (1989).  other.  However,  to  date,  few  studies have  sought
Wave  dummies  can be used  to  capture  an  aggre-  to distinguish alternative  expectations  regimes  us-
gate price  expectations  component.  For example,  ing  survey data.
Goodfriend  (1992)  suggests  using  individual's
variation  from  aggregate  expectation  in disaggre-  Summary
gated supply  equations  like  (56).  Using  this  tech-
nique,  all  commonality  in individual expectations  A major reason survey-based  studies have focused
is purged.  However,  the  purging process  may  re-  almost exclusively  on testing  the rational  expecta-
sult in the false inference that  agents do not make  tions hypothesis  is their inability to distinguish  al-
efficient use of information,  a condition that could  ternative  price  expectations  mechanisms  using
lead to  false rejection of the  rational  expectations  only  survey  data for  expected  price  and price re-
hypothesis  (Goodfriend  1992).  alization  data.  Given  only price  information,  re-
Using revised data in model estimation may also  searchers are restricted to testing unbiasedness  and
bias  hypothesis  tests  and  parameter  estimates  efficiency  of  respondents'  price  forecasts  when
(Keane and Runkle  1990).  Often,  data are revised  compared  with actual price realizations.  These are
after producer's  planning  decisions.  At  the  time  characteristics  of the rational  expectations hypoth-
producers  form price  expectations,  their  informa-  esis,  but  not necessarily of extrapolative  expecta-
tion  sets  contain  the original  data  release.  When  tions mechanisms.  To distinguish  among the myr-
testing  for  rational  expectations,  care  should  be  iad of expectations  mechanisms,  it is necessary  to
taken to use the exact  information set available  at  add more  economic  structure.
the forecast time, without revisions  that have been  To test a broad spectrum of expectations  mech-
made  to  information in the intervening  period be-  anisms,  including  those  that  do  not require  unbi-
tween forecast  and academic  research.  asedness  or efficiency,  it is  necessary  to cast hy-
Survey instruments  purport to measure what  an  pothesis tests concerning  price expectations  mech-
individual  is thinking, but responses  are generally  anisms  in  terms  of  producers'  choice  variables.
without consequences to the respondent.  This is in  The  price  expectation  mechanism  resulting  in
contrast to market  data,  which  are gathered  from  model predictions that most closely correspond  to
observing what individuals actually do. In surveys,  observed  behavior  can  be  accepted  as  the  one  to
there  is no  incentive  for respondents  to correctly  which producers  are actually adhering.  Since price
reveal their expectations  nor  any  way  to mitigate  expectations  in commodity markets  affect  produc-
such problems as interviewer-induced bias, survey  tion, it is reasonable to cast hypotheses concerning
instrument-induced  bias,  etc.  Hence,  any  conclu-  price expectations  mechanisms in terms of supply.
sions  about  individuals'  expectations  resulting  This  can be achieved through the nonnested model228  October 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
specification  tests  discussed  in  the  previous  sec-  hypothesis  tests  that  are  available  using only  sur-
tion.  vey data.  In the  future,  a hypothesis  test  strategy
When  survey  data  are  available,  a  benchmark  that combines observed  firm-level data with survey
model  comprised  of  supply  (56)  and  demand  (3)  data of producer price expectations  may be used to
can be estimated directly using the survey data for  distinguish each producer's  adherence  to  a partic-
expected  price  and  expected  price  variance.  The  ular  price  expectations  mechanism.  In  the  final
benchmark  model can then  be tested against  each  analysis,  each  market  participant  has  to make his
alternative  price  expectations  mechanism  by  (1)  own guess about what  the future  will bring.  Some
substituting the assumed price expectation function  will  take  great  care  in  making  their  projections;
into  supply,  (2)  estimating  the  model  as  if price  others will  not.  It  seems  unlikely that all individ-
expectations were not observed,  and (3)  using non-  uals  will follow the  same rule.
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